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Capital Discipline and Financial Market Relations in Retail Globalization: 
Insights from the Case of Tesco plc 
 
Abstract  
This paper provides an in-depth study of leading transnational food retailer Tesco plc to 
explore how its financial management and relations with the investment community – 
notably its reputation for capital discipline – underpinned successful expansion.  Informed by 
close dialogue with equity analysts, we investigate how this model deteriorated since the late 
2000s with declining returns, leading to high-profile international divestitures.  The analysis 
assesses the drivers of these difficulties, and conceptualises them.  It examines how the 
retailer, pressured by the investment community, reviewed its international strategy and 
attempted to ‘reset’ its relations with capital markets to re-emphasise shareholder value and 
returns.  The research teases out the manner in which legitimacy with capital markets 
underpins the extent, pace and form of global retail expansion, leading to significant 
implications for workers, consumers and wider stakeholders across spatially dispersed host 
markets.   
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1. Introduction 
The 2013 Annual General Meeting of international food retailer, Tesco plc, witnessed 
remarkable events.  Without warning, former CEO and Chairman, Lord Ian MacLaurin, 
directed incendiary comments at the recently retired and highly regarded Sir Terry Leahy, 
who had stood down in 2011 after 14 years as CEO.  Leahy had masterminded the strategic 
diversification of the firm – notably Tesco's transformation from primarily a domestic 
operation, with a limited presence outside the UK, into the third largest international retailer 
by revenue (Coe and Lee, 2013).  Despite Leahy's record of consistently increasing Tesco's 
annual operating profit during that period from £774m to £3.8bn, MacLaurin's assessment 
was that: 
 
‘when you judge the performance of a chief executive, you not only judge the 
performance of his day-to-day operation, but you also have to judge his legacy, and I 
think we are all very sad in this hall to see the legacy that Terry Leahy left’ (Financial 
Times, 2013, 1 & 10).  
 
So what had produced such a damning critique?  After all, Leahy had been a CEO widely 
admired for having skilfully negotiated the potentially hazardous transformation of the 
retailer into a champion of Britain’s role in the global economy ‘under the radar’ of hostile 
public and financial market scrutiny (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010).  The answer lay in the 
manner in which the retailer’s aggregate performance – overall across its many divisions and 
specifically in its home market – had disappointed over the previous two years.  Critics 
argued that recent international expansion had come at the expense of a focus on tight capital 
discipline and returns1.  This was illustrated most notably in April 2013 when the firm 
announced that it was intending to exit the United States – the last and most high risk of the 
                                                 
1 We use the term ‘capital discipline’ to refer simply to the ability of a firm to balance its capital expenditure 
with its returns on investment.  Notably, this is somewhat different to the way the term is often employed by 
some finance communities to justify systematic and wide ranging restructuring programmes involving cost 
cutting and subsequent job loss. 
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Leahy expansions – incurring a £1bn write-off and not far short of £1bn of trading losses 
(Shore Capital, 2013a) along with £150m in market exit costs.  As pressures from the 
investment community began to mount, there were admissions by Tesco senior management 
that the rate of international expansion would be pared back involving reduced capital 
investment and a stricter focus on productivity and returns.  Such admissions provided a 
marked contrast to the earlier period of Leahy’s tenure as CEO (the late 1990s and early 
2000s), when Tesco was widely regarded as a retailer that had been disciplined with its 
capital expenditure and lauded by the financial community on that basis.   
In this context we note that issues of financial control and the relationships with capital 
markets have remained under-developed themes in the literature on the globalization of 
retailing.  In consequence, this paper contributes to our understanding of these issues by 
analysing the experience of one of the world's leading transnational retailers, interrogating 
how its management of finance and relationships with the finance community affected the 
nature, scale and direction of its expansion to the start of 2014.  More specifically, we use an 
in-depth case study to fulfil the following objectives: 
 
(1) To explore the link between successful international retail expansion strategy, capital 
discipline and support from the financial markets; 
(2) To assess the drivers behind deterioration in capital discipline in international retail 
expansion and to analyse the responses of the investment community to this;  
(3) To conceptualise retailer responses to weakening trust by the investment community 
and to appraise the implications this has for the geography of retail globalization more 
widely. 
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The paper is structured as follows: first, drawing on research across economic geography, we 
explore the importance of relations with the capital markets in retail TNC expansion and 
identify equity analysts2 as key barometers of investment opinion.  Second, we briefly 
explain our chosen methodological approach − an in-depth case study.  Third, we examine 
how our case study retailer achieved high levels of international expansion while maintaining 
a tight grip on capital discipline which served to mollify the financial markets for a number 
of years.  Fourth, these insights inform examination of the breakdown in capital discipline at 
the retailer which led to wide ranging capital market pressure on the firm.  Fifth, we assess 
how, in 2013, the retailer has attempted to ‘reset’ its relationships with the investment 
community and the implications that this has for international expansion strategy.  In doing 
so, we explore the relational challenge of maintaining support from the capital markets, 
engaging with practice at the firm level within a case study context.  We conclude by 
considering the strategic implications of finance and firm relationships for conceptualising 
international business expansion in economic geography. 
 
2. Finance Community Relations in Retail TNC Expansion 
Transnational retail expansion became a focus of cross social-science scholarship in the early 
2000s as the surge of retail FDI in the late 1990s and its impacts on emerging markets in East 
Asia, Central/Eastern Europe and Latin America became increasingly clear (see Dawson, 
2007).  Transnational retail expansion is distinctive compared to other international business 
in terms of the relative importance of organizational and scale economies, sensitivity to 
cultural and societal contexts, high labour costs and the capital demands of store networks 
and distribution facilities (Burt et al., 2015).  The financial drivers of such expansion over the 
past 20 years have included free cash flow from core markets, access to low cost debt or 
                                                 
2 This paper uses the terms “equity”, “sell-side” and “securities” analyst interchangeably. 
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equity capital, super-normal returns accruing to first-movers in emerging markets, 
international merger and acquisition opportunities/multiples and negative working capital 
cycles (Wrigley, 2000a).  Importantly, such financial drivers have been given the same 
prominence as the more conventional retail management and systems capabilities (innovative 
formats, sophisticated distribution/logistic and supply-chain management systems, human-
capital resource methods and ‘best practice’ knowledge transfer techniques) in accounting for 
the flow of retail FDI into emerging markets which were increasingly pursuing policies of 
full or partial liberalization of FDI (Wood et al., 2014).  That is to say, from its outset 
economic geography scholarship on retail globalization was linked to the wider concerns of 
several disciplines with what has been termed ‘financialization’ – ‘shorthand for the growing 
influence of capital markets, their intermediaries, and processes in contemporary economic 
and political life’ (Pike and Pollard, 2010, 30).  In particular, the link centred on the need ‘to 
understand firm finances as integral to our understandings of firm behaviour, governance and 
strategy’ (Pollard, 2003, 422) and to recognise how it ‘alters behaviour and values in the 
economy’ (Christopherson et al., 2013, 352). 
Financialization has impacted retail globalization in many ways.  There has been an 
increasing focus on enhancing shareholder value leading to battles for corporate control, with 
attempts being made to restrict managerial freedom to engage in what is regarded by some 
stakeholder groups as essentially ‘unaccountable’ and ‘non value-adding’ expansionary 
investment into international markets (Palmer and Quinn, 2005).  The emphasis on 
shareholder value has also led to changes in the ways that retail firms operate.  For example, 
the global sourcing and supply networks of many of the leading apparel and fashion retailers 
have increasingly externalised low ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) production-related 
activities (such as manufacturing, assembly and distribution) to instead focus on the higher 
ROCE core competencies of design, marketing, etc. (Milberg, 2008).  Correspondingly, many 
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retailers have rationalised their supplier base to stabilise relations with a few ‘preferred’ 
producers (Palpacuer, 2006).   
More widely, Baud and Durand (2012) have explored the issue of how many retail TNCs 
were simultaneously able to increase returns on equity despite home market performance 
slowing.  They argue that a blend of global expansion and the financialization of assets, 
alongside practices of ‘working capital management’, have leveraged concessions from less 
influential actors in the value network such as workers and vendors.  In this context, 
unsurprisingly the pressures exerted by the focus on maintaining shareholder value are, at 
times, seen as conflicting with wider CSR values, sustainable operations and the maintenance 
of stakeholder partnerships (Hughes, 2012). 
 
2.1 Relationships with the capital markets in retail TNC expansion 
Consistent with Coe et al.’s (2014) concerns regarding an under-appreciation of finance 
within the wider global production networks literature, the role of relationships with the 
providers of finance and the financial community in the retail globalization process remains 
under-developed.  Many retail TNCs employ a so-called ‘pecking order’ preference for 
raising finance – preferring to use internal funds, then low-risk debt, and finally, if the 
amount raised remains insufficient for their needs, equity (Myers, 2001).  Consequently, they 
may seldom make use of their capability to raise capital in the equity markets.  Nevertheless, 
share prices and in turn shareholder value remain extremely important objectives for active 
management given that most borrowing is based upon credit ratings derived from share price 
performance (Christopherson et al., 2013).  Consequently, pressures to improve the share 
price can significantly affect corporate behaviour and, as a result, retaining the faith of the 
capital markets is essential. 
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Investment houses and pension funds are responsible for shrewdly investing on behalf 
of their clients and consider guidance from equity analysts, the retailers themselves, and the 
wider financial media relating to company operations, strategy and performance forecasts.  
Figure 1 (building on Wrigley and Lowe, 2002) positions equity analysts within the 
stakeholder system of corporate governance, locating them between the suppliers of finance 
and the corporate board of the firm.  Equity analysts assess the performance of firms and 
issue research reports that include forecasts of the firm’s stock price – in turn recommending 
whether the stock should be classified as ‘Buy’, ‘Hold’ or ‘Sell’ (Westphal and Clement, 
2008).  These judgements ‘set the investment climate’ for entire retail sectors and individual 
retailers.  One influential study found that on average, the stock price adjusts up 5 percent 
(for added-to-buy changes) and down 11 percent (for added-to-sell changes) (Womack, 1996) 
with the effects of changes to analyst recommendations persisting for several months (Ryan 
and Taffler, 2006). 
 
Take in Figure 1 
 
By occupying a governance role that seeks to overcome the well-known tension between 
ownership and control, equity analysts are an important source of external institutional 
pressure on a firm (Benner and Ranganathan. 2012).  Naturally, analyst knowledge is far 
from being a universal “truth” but is instead socially constructed through intra-, inter- and 
extra- firm relations and practices, which, in part, are the product of analysts’ own work 
practices and background (Hall, 2007).  Although they typically combine quantitative and 
qualitative insights to exhibit a ‘rhetoric of scientific rigour’ (Hall, 2006, 663), like any other 
financial actor, analysts are subject to the negative effects of heuristics and cognitive bias in 
their financial decision-making (cf. Strauss, 2009).  In particular, partly due to the necessarily 
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specialised nature of analyst knowledge within their particular industry, they have been found 
to suffer greater degrees of ‘lock-in’ than might be expected by tending to respond more 
favourably to strategies that extend and preserve existing technologies rather than adapting to 
new ones (Benner, 2010).   
 
2.2 Managing the relational analyst–retail TNC dynamic  
Given the importance of investment opinion and forecasts from analysts, retail TNCs are 
keen to maintain legitimacy in capital markets and actively ‘manage the stock market 
perception of their company’ (Sparks, 1996, 166).  In part, this could be viewed as an attempt 
to increase their proximity to, and influence over, key opinion makers in capital markets.  
While the power to achieve such influence may be seen as structural and embedded within 
particular job roles, we also understand that power can also be relational and emerge through 
social interaction (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009).  As both Glückler (2006) and Hall (2014) 
note, personal relationships often underpin successful internationalization as socio-cultural 
proximity with the providers of finance positively affects ongoing power relations.  In turn, 
physical, cultural, virtual and organisational proximity within financial networks can partly 
govern one’s position and influence within such relationships (Jones and Search, 2009).   
Retail TNCs regularly increase physical and virtual proximity to financial market 
opinion setters, both through media engagement and by granting analysts excellent access to 
senior management through investor conference calls and earnings announcements (Clark et 
al., 2004).  But perhaps more beneficial is the personal contact established through on-site 
visits, informal discussions following management presentations, and one-to-one phone calls 
which offer insight into ‘qualitative factors such as quality of management or strategic 
credibility’ (García-Meca, 2005, 428).  A recent survey of US equity analysts suggested that 
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98.4% enjoyed direct contact at CEO or CFO level with the firms they covered at least once a 
year, with 53.2% reporting at least five times a year (Brown et al., 2015).   
Providing analysts access to senior management is clearly underpinned by the self-
interest of the firm, but it is part of a complex reciprocal dependency.  Analysts need the 
access to triangulate their quantitative investment analysis, but are well aware of the price of 
access to that relational network.  That is to say, while investor relations departments of firms 
are managing expectations and correcting misconceptions, they are also acting as a vehicle of 
control and coercion.  At its worst, that might involve ‘penaliz[ing] an analyst by threatening 
to withhold investment banking business to the firm that employs the analyst’ (Rao and 
Sivakumar, 1999, 33).  In this context, issuing negative, sell recommendations is inherently 
risky, leading to ‘herding behaviour’ with analysts reluctant to stand out from the crowd 
when they convey negative information (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010).  Yet firms themselves 
are also known to obfuscate through misleading signalling to capital markets.   
Because of, and despite, these imperfections in the governance of capital markets, 
analysts remain influential active agents affecting both the accessibility of funding for 
international retail expansion, but also the form that it takes.  Palmer and Quinn’s interviews 
with retail equity analysts a decade ago (2003; 2005) revealed the generally sceptical views 
of analysts concerning cross border expansion, especially regarding the implications for short 
term profitability.  They further underlined the importance of entering retail markets at an 
early stage of development and exhibited negative views concerning merger and acquisition 
as an entry method, not least due to the high degrees of upfront capital commitment.  Instead, 
they noted a preference for tight capital discipline with organic (greenfield) expansion funded 
out of working capital on the back of vendors’ credit with minimal recourse to equity capital 
or debt financing.   
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2.3 Losing the faith of the capital markets in retail TNC expansion 
In the context of the previous discussion, it is unsurprising that retailers have historically 
been severely penalised when the investment community perceives an over-leveraged 
acquisition, a loss of discipline in allocating capital expenditure, or neglect of operations in 
the home market.  In some cases, the investment community loses faith completely in the 
internationalization strategies of retailers, with the case of Dutch food retailer, Royal Ahold 
particularly apposite, providing parallels with Tesco’s experience in this paper (Wrigley and 
Currah, 2003).  While Ahold had funded its largely acquisitive international expansion in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s by successive equity placements and high levels of debt, when 
views concerning the emerging markets of Latin America and East Asia which Ahold had 
entered turned negative, the retailer found its pipeline of equity funding effectively closed: 
 
‘What had once been an important competitive advantage in a rapidly globalizing and 
consolidating industry – namely Ahold’s high tolerance for financial leverage – suddenly 
became an important competitive disadvantage as it was forced to ‘tear up the script’ of 
its previous corporate strategy and adopt a new strategy of organic ‘capital-efficient’ 
growth’ (Wrigley and Currah, 2003, 236). 
 
In particular, if performance in the retailer’s home market deteriorates, analysts become 
increasingly sensitive to international market returns and the associated toll on senior 
management time, and begin to demand ‘core market focus’ (Wrigley, 2000b).  Over the past 
decade, multinational retailers have become increasingly sensitive to the level of returns their 
international investments generate.  In consequence, there is evidence of a decrease in ‘flag 
planting’ expansion involving the creation of under-developed businesses across numerous 
host markets with a shift toward strategies focused on growing market share in fewer, select 
countries where profitable trading scale can be established (Dawson and Mukoyama, 2014). 
Having considered the importance financialized retail firms necessarily place on 
managing relations with the capital markets during internationalization, and the significant 
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role that equity analysts as a consequence play in that process, we now move on to explore 
and illustrate those themes using an in-depth case study. 
 
3. Methodological Issues 
Before presenting a case study of one of the world’s leading international food retailers., it is 
essential to address two important methodological issues raised by our study – the potential 
and limitations of single-firm case studies, and similar issues in relation to the construction of 
knowledge from what Clark (1988) refers to as ‘close dialogue’.   
Case studies have long been favoured in economic geography and are known to offer 
opportunities to build theory in the social sciences.  Yet not all economic geographers are 
convinced (Markusen, 2003) and we acknowledge those concerns regarding issues of rigour, 
generality and counterexamples.  Single-firm case studies, as a sub-set of the category, have 
recently been suggested to present an extra dimension of concerns (Tokatli, 2014).  Our 
response to these issues has two dimensions.  First, not all case studies are equivalent in 
terms of their ‘comparative potential’ − that is to say gaining analytical traction and 
conceptual leverage by facilitating study of the same firm at different points in time; 
compared to other equivalent firms experiencing similar events (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010, 
385-86).  Second, it is not only economic geographers who have argued for the value of 
single-firm case studies, with the approach gaining traction across the social sciences, 
including disciplines more commonly characterised by positivist methodologies (Tokatli, 
2014). 
More specifically, in this study, Tesco is selected as a timely “critical case” which 
Barnes et al. (2007, 10) define as ‘capable of generating new theoretical insights, rather than 
merely illustrating extant theory claims’.  The retailer illustrates both adherence to tight 
capital discipline and robust relations with the financial markets in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
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and also a period of deterioration of that discipline and its reputation for financial prudence.  
Such a longitudinal perspective of relative success and then relative failure in this regard − 
tracking the change from what may be perceived as ‘tight’ towards more ‘loose’ capital 
discipline, offers the dimensions of comparison which, we suggest, are key elements in 
increasing the conceptual leverage of the single case study method.  
While our focus is particularly on the retail firm–equity analyst dynamic as a surrogate 
for the means by which the retail firm seeks to manage its relationship with the investment 
community, we recognise the myriad of other nodal linkages within the relational networks 
between the firm and financial markets; to include for example, exchanges with institutional 
investors and credit rating agencies through AGMs and the business press.  In undertaking 
our analysis we are also mindful that we have the benefit of hindsight, which can affect the 
way we subsequently frame our argument.  As Clark et al. (2007, 20) remind us, ‘the 
language of finance is almost always the language of ex-post legitimisation’.  We are 
conscious of not over-simplifying the challenges of managing international retail expansion 
from the perspective of senior management, nor the difficulty of analysing this strategy from 
a position external to the firm.  A multitude of exogenous pressures challenge the processes 
of strategic management and restructuring within organisations and consequently there are 
limits to both managers’ and analysts’ knowledge and agency (Froud et al., 2000). 
In terms of the operationalization of our method, we have built ongoing links with a 
number of leading equity analyst teams which have provided access to their analysis on a 
longitudinal basis, allowing us to construct a comprehensive analyst report library concerning 
Tesco covering the period 2006-2014 (73 reports) and we have particularly used these 
narratives to inform our study.  Analyst insights were selected for inclusion based on their 
profile within the financial market and their presence at invited analyst/investor meetings 
with the retailer.  These insights were complemented by occasional conversations with some 
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of the analysts (n1 = 7) to clarify any issues as well as numerous follow up email exchanges.  
Of course ‘close dialogue’ raises concerns over possible ‘seduction and cooption’ (Clark, 
1998, 80) — that is to say, becoming duped by ‘stories in the process of formation and 
competition for dominance’, and constructed to ‘deliver a particular set of accumulation 
outcomes’ (O’Neill, 2001, 194).  We are conscious of the need to challenge widely held 
‘universal truths’ within firm-level case studies (Tokatli, 2014) – something that requires 
extensive triangulation of the corporate narrative.  Therefore, following Denzin (1970), we 
have used extensive ‘within-method’ triangulation to mitigate these potential problems in 
terms of contrasting numerous different analyst viewpoints over time, but also ‘between-
method’ triangulation (contrasting research methods).  We have achieved this by analysing 
recordings and transcripts of management results presentations, telephone conference calls 
and associated investor Q&A sessions (at preliminary and interim results meetings), 
assessing the slide presentations and analyst packs the retail firm produced for these 
occasions (n2 = 43), consulting the presentations/documents from specialist analyst briefing 
sessions and ‘road trips’ (n3 = 85), as well as the annual reports and strategy reports produced 
by the retailer (n4 =  33).  We have also reviewed the insights from national media sources 
(e.g. Financial Times), the trade press (e.g. Retail Week), and benefitted from discussions 
with (and reading the analysis generated by) retail industry analysts and consultants who have 
knowledge of Tesco’s expansion.  Therefore, our insights are both empirical and conceptual 
and derive from working ‘backwards and forwards between theory and the empirical world in 
a reflexive manner’ (Clark, 2007, 191). 
 
4. Capital Discipline in Tesco’s Internationalization 
4.1 Tesco's emergence as a multinational operator 
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Tesco has built a retail presence across three continents, accounting for over £72bn in sales 
and £2bn in pre-tax profit in 2012/13, at which time it was the largest food retailer in four of 
the 11 markets within which it operated.  Table 1 highlights the increasing importance of 
international operations over the period 2000-2014, with the core UK market decreasing in 
relative importance to 69% in sales terms in 2014 from 90% in 2000.  Similarly, the 
importance of the home market in contributing operating profit decreased from 95% in 2000 
to 70% in 2014.  The level of capital expenditure and acquisition activity supporting this 
growth has been considerable – between the fiscal years 2005 and 2012 the retailer expended 
an estimated £28.8bn (Shore Capital, 2013b). 
 
Take in Table 1 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of Tesco’s continuing international operations in 2013.  
Particularly notable were the differences in presence and relative performance between 
countries and continents.  The home UK market and Asian operations achieved healthy 
trading margins, while the European businesses trailed considerably.  Recent under-
performance was marked with poor like-for-like sales growth across much of Europe but also 
in South Korea, where protectionist regulations restricted opening times in large stores (Coe 
and Lee, 2013).  There remained a number of under-developed businesses in the portfolio, 
notably within China where Tesco achieved only a 0.2% market share and Turkey where the 
retailer accounted for only 1.3% of the food market. 
 
Take in Table 2 
 
4.2 The foundations of capital discipline in Tesco’s international expansion 
In this section, we address our objective of exploring the link between successful 
international retail expansion strategy and capital discipline to retain the support of the 
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financial markets.  However, prior to exploring how capital discipline was particularly 
exhibited by Tesco, it is essential to acknowledge the retailer’s pro-active management of its 
financial reputation through the strengthening, and maintenance of, relational networks with 
equity analysts as explored in a more general sense earlier in the paper.  Beyond presence at 
results meetings and taking advantage of the associated Q&A which is well known within the 
literature, analysts also enjoy access to senior management on a more informal basis to 
include regular senior management telephone contact if analysts require clarification on 
specific points.  Particularly noteworthy and somewhat beyond the extent of the relational 
networks described in Section 2 are specialist analyst ‘away days’ and ‘road trips’ that have 
occurred over the past decade.  At times these have been based in the UK and focused 
exclusively on UK strategy (for example in 2002; 2006; 2012; 2014), but also such trips have 
been explicitly international in orientation and location – for example, Europe (2011); Asia 
(2008; 2010) and the United States (2007).  These visits are structured to include formal 
presentations with questions and store tours – sometimes to include competitor units – as well 
as visits to distribution centres.  Importantly, they offer both formal and informal contact with 
senior management within the retail firm.  They play a critical role in information exchange 
and facilitate the development of personal relationships between analysts and senior 
management, away from the ‘hot house’ atmosphere of formal results meetings.   
Earlier in the paper we noted the imperfect nature of financial decision-making and 
the issue of power within such networks.  Particularly with investor ‘road trips’ there is a risk 
of analyst judgement becoming clouded by senior management as they are exposed to what 
the firm wants them to see rather than a necessarily more representative picture of its 
operations and performance.  Such a relational network is privileged, often relatively small, 
and while the retailer makes any formal slide presentations at these events available to wider 
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parties through its investor relations web site, there is clearly opportunity and benefit gleaned 
from more informal, unrecorded, contact and exchange. 
In contrast to the tendency across international retailers to increase presence across 
multiple international markets without subsequently building profitable scale in those 
countries, Tesco had, until recently, been widely regarded as a firm that was judicious in its 
marshalling of capital and achieved profitable returns in its international expansion.  First, 
market entry in Tesco’s international expansion was typically achieved through limited up 
front capital commitment – small acquisitions or joint venture partnerships.  If such 
investments proved successful, the retailer would normally increase investment to secure 
majority or outright control and then pursue organic growth.  This contrasts with the 
alternative of large-scale acquisitive or organic entry that would require considerable up-front 
sunk costs and immediate extensive capital exposure.  In doing so, the retailer focused 
primarily on under-developed retail markets characterised by weak retail competition, a retail 
structure offering few ‘modern’ retail formats and a growing middle class – conditions 
positively associated with performance more generally for international retailers (Coe and 
Wrigley, 2007).  By entering markets early in their development, Tesco sought to become the 
1st or 2nd largest operator in the country, often by leveraging its hypermarket format.  Table 3 
underlines the limited commitment of these initial investments, with much of Tesco’s capital 
expenditure occurring in the years following such transactions, once each respective in-
country business model was proven to be viable.  In many of the joint venture relationships, 
with South Korea being the best example, the initial ownership was relatively even between 
partners, yet as the business demonstrated its profitability, the UK retailer progressively 
increased its share until it achieved outright control.  In other instances, such as in the Czech 
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and Slovak Republics, modestly sized acquisitions were made to gain footholds prior to 
subsequent organic growth and larger capital commitment. 3 
 
Take in Table 3 
 
There are wider benefits that assist in realising territorial embeddedness which accrue from 
small acquisitions or joint venture relationships, including the knowledge gained of the host 
market, along with acquiring some degree of political influence (Wood and Reynolds, 2014).  
This approach also permits the retention of a ‘local’ customer fascia at least initially, 
leverages any market-specific retail skills in the management of operations acquired, and 
provides some degree of market scale prior to any organic expansion.   
Second, having entered host countries, Tesco typically opted out of tempting acquisition 
opportunities if they failed to offer the necessary returns even if they promised a step-change 
in market coverage.  Indeed, the analyst and wider investor community are naturally sceptical 
regarding high commitments of capital expenditure to new markets and international 
acquisitions (Palmer and Quinn, 2005) – something which is plainly evident in the forensic 
detail with which questions are asked in the Q&A sessions following the retailer’s results 
presentations.  While international retail expansion is often associated with senior 
management ‘empire building’, until recently the retailer had benefitted from an experienced 
and stable senior leadership team that assessed expansion opportunities judiciously.  As 
BOAML (2011, 6) reflected as late as 2011: 
 
‘Thankfully, we don't sense Tesco is in any rush to buy assets and is firmly focused on 
capital discipline and future-proofing the business.’ 
                                                 
3 This model of development was the product of a painful learning process from Tesco’s early failed attempts at 
internationalization, such as its expansion into France (1992) and its first entry into Ireland (1979) (Palmer, 
2005).  By learning from such errors, a model for expansion emerged by the early-mid 1990s that involved a 
thorough appraisal of new markets, limited up-front capital exposure and a focus on countries with under-
developed retail structures. 
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There were numerous instances when such prudence had been evident.  For example, in 2010 
when French food retailer, Carrefour announced that it was intending to auction its Thai, 
Malaysian and Singaporean operations, there was widespread speculation that Tesco would 
acquire the assets.  Carrefour’s 42 stores in Thailand could have transformed Tesco’s market 
position given the complementary spatial fit between the two portfolios.  Tesco CEO at the 
time, Terry Leahy, underscored the requirement of capital discipline: ‘It makes sense in the 
sense that they’re in-country acquisitions…but it depends on price always’ (quoted in 
Financial Times, 2010).  While Tesco bid conservatively for the Thai operations, it was 
unsuccessful and they were sold to another French retailer, Casino.  The remaining Malaysian 
and Singaporean stores were retained by Carrefour.  Instead of castigating Tesco 
management for missing out on a potentially transformative acquisition, key UK analysts 
commended the retailer for retaining its focus on returns and efficiency. 
 
‘[Capital] discipline has prevented acquisitions that in prior years may have been pursued, 
especially in Asia to good effect from a returns perspective in our view...[We] believe 
organic growth and capital discipline are the order of the day, organic growth that is 
slower to yield rewards from a momentum perspective than acquisition, but tends to 
produce higher returns over time’ (Shore Capital, 2010a, 35, our emphasis). 
 
This is not to say that Tesco shied away from acquisitions when assets were valued 
favourably and offered the potential for significant value creation and a complementary 
spatial fit.  One such successful acquisition occurred in 2008 with the purchase by the South 
Korean Samsung-Tesco business of 36 Homever hypermarkets for £958m − a price that was 
a little over net asset value but below replacement cost (Shore Capital, 2010b).  The acquired 
portfolio offered a good spatial match with the existing store base, being concentrated around 
Seoul where Tesco lacked a significant presence.  Emphasising a focus on capital discipline, 
the deal was structured such that 50% of the price was paid on acquisition and the other half 
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when designated sales uplifts were achieved.  There was considerable potential to realise 
such increased performance given the disparity between the returns on the acquired units 
(£283 per sq ft) versus Samsung-Tesco at the time (£437 per sq ft) (Nomura Capital, 2009). 
Third, Tesco frequently funded international expansion without recourse to external 
capital.  One source of funds came from a spatial switching of retail capital by exploiting its 
valuable freehold UK property portfolio through sale-and-leaseback initiatives.  Between 
2007 and 2012, the retailer sold £6bn-worth of property globally, giving it net divestments of 
£5.2bn on which it has made £1.3bn of profit (Financial Times, 2012).  UK analysts asserted 
that by 2011, Tesco’s international properties were worth £14-£15bn (Citigroup, 2011) with 
75% of space freehold in Asia and 90-95% for all markets outside China (Nomura Capital, 
2009).   
While the UK historically acted as the ‘cash cow’ for international expansion, the 
international businesses themselves contained a mix of mature and developing operations that 
provided returns over different timescales.  Given that hypermarkets are deemed to mature 
after four years of trading (Shore Capital, 2010b), South Korea and Thailand in particular had 
matured into reliable profit centres which provided capital to fund international businesses at 
earlier stages of development.  Indeed, Shore Capital (2010a, 8) suggested that the 
performance of South Korea ‘gives Tesco a certain degree of licence to explore other 
markets’.  The first move to exploit the value specifically accrued in the international store 
estate occurred in August 2012, when the retailer announced that it had completed a sale-and-
leaseback deal in South Korea for four Homeplus stores and accompanying mall space, with 
total gross proceeds in excess of £300m (Tesco plc, 2012) followed by an announcement of a 
further four Homeplus stores in January 2014, raising a further £355m (Tesco plc, 2014).  
Confidence in the Asian property portfolio to generate returns was such that in 2012 the 
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retailer launched an IPO of its Thailand Property Fund4 to finance further in-country retail 
property development – raising £152m and involving 17 Tesco Lotus hypermarkets located 
in several provinces across the country (The Scotsman, 2012). 
Fourth, Tesco assessed its likelihood of success and divested out of markets that were not 
long term opportunities in an intelligent manner.  By limiting its up-front capital exposure in 
markets where performance was unproven, and then by preparing for divestiture where this 
was necessary, the negative effects of departing a market were partially mitigated.  In doing 
so, communication regarding strategy with the financial community was key.  As one analyst 
noted five years prior to the announcement of Tesco’s exit of Japan in 2012, the retailer was 
limiting its liabilities: 
 
‘The fact that the company has not over-committed, taking time to understand the 
customer, the supply chain and the competition speaks volumes about its overall 
approach to all markets’ (Shore Capital, 2007, 54). 
 
By writing down the final tranche of Japanese goodwill (£55m) in its 2010/11 interim results, 
Tesco was preparing for divestment which meant that its eventual announcement in 2012 had 
an immaterial effect on the share price.   
Other approaches have seen strategic divestment that has bolstered market position 
elsewhere.  For example, in 2005 when Tesco exited Taiwan, it successfully agreed to swap 
its hypermarket assets with 11 Carrefour hypermarkets in the Czech Republic – another of 
Tesco’s international markets5.  Such tactical moves cast divestment not necessarily as an 
outright failure but an international spatial switching of retail capital that can reinforce 
position in strong markets by sacrificing stores in peripheral or under-performing regions. 
 
                                                 
4 “Tesco Lotus Retail Growth Freehold and Leasehold Property Fund” 
5 There were also plans for a further four hypermarkets in Slovakia but this purchase was vetoed by the 
government competition authorities and the stores were returned to Carrefour. 
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5. Exploring the Breakdown in Capital Discipline in Tesco’s International Expansion 
Strategy  
In this section, we address our objective of assessing the drivers behind a deterioration in 
capital discipline in international retail expansion and analyse the responses of the investment 
community to this.  Given the vastly improved scale and profitability of Tesco over the past 
twenty years, what lay behind the weakening in its reputation for financial prudence?  
Tesco’s performance slowed slightly in 2011/12, but it was in 2012/13 when trading profit 
declined by 10.3% in its Asian business and 37.8% in its European operations (cf. –8.3% in 
the UK).  While such concerns were undoubtedly driven partly by the global economic 
downturn, they were also indicative of a sector-wide shift in many markets from large 
hypermarkets towards more frequent and smaller shopping trips and thus smaller format 
stores (Wood and McCarthy, 2014).  Moreover, the poor performance was also likely the 
function of emerging deficiencies in Tesco’s pricing, product ranging, marketing and store 
operations that have since become increasingly apparent through 2014/15.  These 
disappointing results were compounded by the announcement in April 2013 of the intention 
to divest the US business, Fresh & Easy, which Tesco started in 2007 and consumed circa 
£1bn of capital investment, along with a similar level of trading losses.  However, the level of 
returns in relation to capital investment was becoming a concern across the international 
operations.  By early 2012, the comments of Citigroup analyst, Alastair Johnson on the 
longitudinal performance of Tesco were typical of the investment community: 
 
‘In every one of these years Tesco’s retail business yielded similar operational cash flow, 
a sequentially disappointing trajectory given the fast-paced expansion of the store estate 
and heavy capital expenditures’ (Citigroup, 2012a, 3). 
 
A fundamental problem lay in the declining productivity and profitability of retail space at a 
time when capital expenditure dedicated to international operations continued at a high level.  
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In particular, under-developed operations in countries such as China consumed extremely 
high levels of capital expenditure yet remained stubbornly loss making, leading to analyst 
concerns that ‘internally generated funds [are] not covering ‘all in’ cap ex and dividends 
[so]… leverage is rising’ (Citigroup, 2011, 11).  Two years prior to the severe deterioration in 
performance, analysts were actively questioning the level of investment in the international 
business in relation to returns: 
 
‘Appropriate action requires a pause for breath and consideration of whether Tesco’s 
high space growth model is appropriate over the next five years’ (Citigroup, 2011, 14). 
 
In the following section, we briefly examine Tesco’s most high profile expansion – the 
development of the US Fresh & Easy business – and how it came to exemplify the difficulties 
of capital expenditure in relation to returns. 
 
5.1 The anatomy of failure in the United States  
The embodiment of Tesco’s loss of capital discipline was its resource intensive entry into the 
US.  Some brief reflection on this approach is instructive in the context of the disciplined 
expansion strategy that had earlier been pursued by the retailer.  Tesco entered the US market 
from a standing start – organically developing a new, 10,000 sq ft small supermarket format, 
the ‘Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market’, focused on the west coast, initially within 
California, Nevada and Arizona (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010).  At the time, Chief Executive, 
Terry Leahy acknowledged the capital commitment and ‘reputational risks’ but argued the 
potential returns warranted such a bullish strategy: 
 
‘[W]e've carefully balanced the risk. If it fails it's embarrassing. It might show up in my 
career [and] it'll cost an amount of money that's easily affordable by Tesco—call it £1 
billion if you like. If it succeeds then it's transformational’. (Terry Leahy cited in The 
Economist, 2007) 
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The business model marked a significant departure from the staged management of 
risk and investment described in Section 4.2 involving joint venture partners or limiting 
initial investment through small acquisitions to gain initial footholds in host markets.  In 
contrast, wholly owned large-scale organic entry to a developed retail market required 
considerable up-front investment with Tesco even bringing with it two food manufacturers 
from its home market – a ‘follower supplier relationship’ – and eventually bought them out 
(Lowe et al., 2012).  As Terry Leahy acknowledged in 2011: 
 
‘There was an incredible amount of work to be done to build the new format, untried 
anywhere in a new country and based upon huge upfront investments in infrastructure.  
Normally you go into a country step by step, but this model wouldn’t allow that.  You 
had to put the infrastructure in first – factories, computers and distribution centres’ (cited 
in Ryle, 2013, 305). 
 
Understandably, given the scale of the venture, there were focused efforts by the retailer 
at courting the investment community beyond the regular contact described earlier in the 
paper.  For example, in November 2007, Tesco led a two day study tour for 68 buy-side and 
36 sell-side analysts across LA and Las Vegas, including visits to the initial Fresh & Easy 
units, competitor stores, its new distribution centre and a mock store/training centre.  Such 
engagement with analysts was important to persuade them of the virtues of the considerable 
upfront investment that implied the initial market entry (encompassing a new store format, 
branding, pricing and product offer) had to be an immediate success.  Given the financial 
outlay, there was minimal margin for error.  The efforts by the retailer to win analyst support 
paid off, with glowing responses from many following the field visit, with ABN-AMRO 
(2007) titling their report on the return to the UK: ‘Don’t Miss the Bus’.  Other assessments 
were also similarly supportive6: 
                                                 
6 While analyst opinion was generally positive regarding the US venture, it is important to note that enthusiasm 
was not universal with the title of a 2007 Credit Suisse’s research note being all too prophetic: ‘It May Be Fresh, 
But It Won’t Be Easy’. 
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‘…we believe that Fresh & Easy will be a major force in the U.S. food business for 
decades to come’ (CIBC World Markets, 2007, 2) 
 
‘It’s absolutely no exaggeration to say that Fresh & Easy has the potential to be the 
ultimate expression of Tesco’s world-beating operating skills, combining these with a 
market that can reward at a speed and scale unmatched in any of its other markets’ 
(Deutsche Bank, 2007, 1). 
 
‘…we believe that Tesco will make a success of its venture, and in all probability hit the 
breakeven point ahead of its February 2010 target’ (Societe Generale, 2007, 4). 
 
Within 18 months, it became clear that success was not going to be immediate as many 
of retail fundamentals appeared to have been overlooked; effects that were compounded by 
the onset of the economic recession.  Of course, it is tempting to simply attribute this failure 
in large part to a tendency to overlook the cultural distance between the UK and US customer 
base and retail environment.  There would be some support from this from management 
studies which makes much of a paradox of psychic distance, whereby ‘operations in 
psychically close countries are not necessarily easy to manage, because assumptions of 
similarity can prevent executives from learning about critical differences’ (O’Grady and 
Lane, 1996, 309).  Indeed, US big-box discount retailer, Target’s recent divestment from 
Canada provides evidence for such a theory.  However, such a view is more difficult to apply 
to Tesco in this instance as it made much of (and the retailer received considerable credit 
from analysts for) the time it spent exploring the opportunity prior to committing to it.  Tesco 
held off entering the US for upwards of three years as it conducted an extensive market 
analysis and a period of ethnographic marketing research, along with format and product 
development (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010).  While the research initially considered an 
acquisitive entry into the US, the retailer implied that research with customers and its reading 
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of the wider competitive market suggested an unmet demand for a small, local quality food 
store.  Unfortunately, its operationalization was disappointing.  It appears that either the 
results of its research were not acted upon or the interpretation of the data led to ill-founded 
strategies.  Analyst reports and subsequent discussions with our respondents uncovered basic 
problems with the stores in terms of their overly clinical feel, lack of assisted service, poor 
store locations and excessive packaging of fresh food for the US consumer.  Consequently, 
store expansion slowed while the retail formula was tinkered with – all at a critical time for 
the fledgling business.  The business model involved high upfront costs and therefore 
necessitated a quick timetable of building scale which required rapid, successful store 
expansion to a critical break-even mass of around 450 stores.  Given the poorly refined retail 
proposition, this was not delivered and the decision to divest occurred when Tesco had 
opened barely 200. 
Difficulties centred not only on the high investment–high commitment business model, 
with concerns also expressed that the retailer failed to receive ‘best value’ given its level of 
capital investment.  Citigroup retrospectively contended that Tesco had overpaid for its 
Distribution Centre, that the incremental cost of store expansion appeared high compared to 
other US retailers, and that the price of the two food suppliers acquired in June 2010 (Wild 
Rocket and 2 Sisters) was excessive: 
 
‘Tesco paid £116m for these two entities, a sum that represented 23% of F&E’s [Fresh & 
Easy’s] entire sales that year. A heavily loss-making chain of leasehold stores in the US 
would typically not command more than 10-15% of sales as a transaction price. Why two 
small suppliers to a heavily loss-making leasehold business in the US should command a 
transaction price well in excess of fair value for the chain itself is difficult to understand’ 
(Citigroup, 2012a, 6). 
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In April 2012, Citigroup argued that the capital expenditure outlay should have been in the 
region of $500-600m versus the actual figure of $1,888m – concerns mirrored across analyst 
houses: 
 
‘The capital intensity of Fresh and Easy is a topic worthy of study.  We can offer no 
explanation for it’ (Citigroup, 2012b, 18). 
 
‘Arguably, Fresh & Easy is a luxury that cannot be afforded when the UK core is 
experiencing tougher times’ (Barclays Capital, 2012, 9). 
 
Next, we assess Tesco’s response to the pressures from the investment community since 
2013; measures which signal commitment to a more conservative approach to capital 
expenditure and increased sensitivity to shareholder returns.  The re-setting of its relationship 
with the investment community marked a definitive change in strategy by Chief Executive, 
Philip Clarke, who replaced Terry Leahy in 2011. 
 
5.2 Resetting the relationship with the capital markets – A new approach to disciplined 
international expansion 
Our final objective is to conceptualise the retailer responses to the weakening trust of the 
investment community and to appraise the implications this has for the geography of retail 
globalization.  Tesco’s recent experience provides wide ranging evidence of attempts to pro-
actively manage such relationships which has led to marked changes in its emerging strategy 
for its international operations.   
In 2013, given Tesco’s poor performance over the previous 18 months, particularly the 
admission that the US operation had failed, incurring a total of £2bn in write-off and trading 
losses, along with £150m of market exit costs (Shore Capital, 2013), it was essential that new 
Chief Executive, Philip Clarke effectively ‘reset’ the relationship of the firm with the capital 
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markets.  Arguably this was easier to do given that the Fresh & Easy strategy was clearly 
wedded to his predecessor, yet in many respects it was acknowledged by our industry 
respondents that his hand was effectively forced in this matter.  The April 2013 preliminary 
results presentation saw the unveiling of a strategic reprioritisation, putting an emphasis on 
generating positive free cash flow, ensuring a disciplined allocation of capital within a range 
of 3.5% to 4% of sales, and maintaining a strong investment grade credit rating.  As Clarke 
commented: 
 
‘I want to be very clear: if there is one lesson to be learned from the past it is the 
importance of capital discipline and this marks the start of a new era of capital discipline 
in Tesco’ (Tesco plc, 2013, 5). 
 
A key element of this reorientation involved the departure of a number of senior board 
level directors from the Leahy era, including Tim Mason (former Fresh & Easy Chief 
Executive) and Richard Brasher (former UK Tesco Chief Executive) as well as many 
executives just below main board level.  As Lowe and Wrigley (2010, 401) recognised at the 
time the international business was expanding, the reputational risk extended far beyond 
Terry Leahy and ‘was shared by the wider board of directors, diffused in complex ways 
across the various levels of the firm’s operational management’.  These changes in key 
leadership positions underlined the significance of the transformation to the investment 
community, secured (for the short term) the new Chief Executive’s authority over the 
governance and direction of the organisation, and saw the retailer parting company with long-
term corporate brokers, JPMorgan Cazenove and Nomura. 
Table 4 summarises the revised strategic prioritisation for international development.  
First, countries where the retailer had established market leadership in growing economies 
and generated high returns, such as Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia, would continue to 
receive investment to further secure position and profitability.  Second, many countries in 
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Europe would see a more conservative allocation of resources, particularly focused on 
convenience and online retailing instead of the widespread construction of hypermarkets.  
Finally, China, India and Turkey were singled out as long term growth opportunities albeit 
characterised by a more cautious approach to capital allocation – one predicated on achieving 
profitable avenues to expansion rather than a ‘jam tomorrow’ strategy that had latterly been 
pursued during the Leahy era. 
 
Take in Table 4 
 
The Chinese business was particularly affected by the more conservative approach.  As 
recently as 2010, the retailer had unveiled a bullish six year China strategy of 80 1m sq ft 
‘Lifespace’ shopping malls, trading across three major regions along the eastern seaboard, 
each anchored by a 100,000 sq ft Tesco hypermarket.  The investment demands would have 
been a considerable £6.25bn, of which Tesco would have contributed £2.5bn, the balance 
being provided by Asian property investors (Shore Capital 2013a).  However, by 2013, the 
retailer’s Chinese business was estimated to be losing in the region of £50m per annum 
(Shore Capital 2013a) and analysts widely doubted its continued viability: 
 
‘Tesco’s determination to go ahead with shopping mall development in China despite its 
operation being sub-scale, thinly spread geographically and challenged from both a profit 
and sales momentum perspective surprises us’ (Citigroup, 2013, 5). 
 
In August 2013, the retailer unsurprisingly signalled a new ‘capital light’ strategy for China, 
consisting of a joint venture with China Resources Enterprise (CRE), a state controlled 
retailer, ranked 2nd largest in China with coverage in 24 of its 34 provinces.  Tesco argued 
this offered a route to growth that prevented it from over-extending its capital commitments, 
with a 20/80 ownership split in favour of CRE.  In addition, the joint venture would create a 
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market leading grocery retailer with sales in excess of current market leader, RT 
Mart/Auchan (IGD, 2013b). 
The reduced resource commitment across the international business was generally well 
received by the investment community at that time.  Most positively, in mid-2013 Shore 
Capital improved their recommendation from ‘Hold’ to ‘Buy’ in the light of the revised 
approach to capital management: 
 
‘Tesco has largely completed a reasonably sustained period of refocus. …Calmer waters 
and clearer focus permit a refined approach that has free cash flow at its core, predicated 
upon sweating its existing substantial asset base harder with lower capital expenditure’ 
(Shore Capital, 2013b, 1). 
 
5.3 Interpreting the loss of capital discipline amid capital market scrutiny 
There are a number of implications specific to this particular case study, but also broader 
findings relevant for integrating finance into studies of international business within 
economic geography more widely.  Specifically in relation to our case study, it is important 
to consider why Tesco departed from its disciplined model of international expansion to one 
that demanded such a high degree of up front capital investment.  But equally, given 
oversight from the capital markets, one should question why the retailer was able to do so and 
effectively avoid the scrutiny of the investment community for so long.   
Tesco’s expansion into the US was the epitome of poor capital discipline in a misguided 
entry into a developed host market that had, without exception, seen previous failed UK food 
retailer expansion.  The manner in which the capital markets remained broadly positive when 
the strategy was announced in 2006 and then stores first opened in 2007 must be seen in the 
context of the significant reputational capital that Chief Executive, Terry Leahy had 
accumulated with the financial markets and the retailer’s efforts to engage analysts with the 
emergent business model.  Leahy’s (and ultimately Tesco’s) relative position and power 
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within the relational network with analysts was extremely strong at the time of the entry to 
the US.  The retailer was increasingly seen as dominating its domestic market and had 
established an effective and profitable portfolio of international operations.   
In 2006/07, given Tesco’s hitherto strong track record of success in international 
expansion, it is understandable how financial actors could easily lead themselves into a ‘more 
of the same’ argument, downplaying the step change in resource commitment that was 
gradually revealed when set against the potential of the US food market.  We know that 
analysts tend to ‘herd’ in their investment outlook and are more reluctant to issue downgrades 
due, in part, to a range of ‘microsocial factors in manager-analyst relationships’ (Westphal 
and Clement, 2008, 890).  Hence it was challenging to look ‘beyond current events to 
underlying patterns and processes’ (Clark, 2011, 9).  Even when expansion of Fresh & Easy 
was stuttering, analysts commonly gave the benefit of the doubt to the experienced 
international retailer – for example, towards the end of 2009, one analysis house headlined 
their commentary on the business thus: ‘Behind schedule but sunk infrastructure capex 
[capital expenditure] and early LFL [like-for-like sales] strength encouraging’ (Nomura 
Capital, 2009, 89). 
In addressing how such a change in strategy was able to be tacitly approved within the 
firm, there were elements of Chief Executive, Terry Leahy’s own overwhelming influence 
within and beyond the immediate governance of the retailer that prevented adequate 
counterweight in decision-making.  Our discussions with analysts emphasised the view that 
there was inadequate internal critique within the retail firm toward the end of the Leahy era.  
As one analyst suggested, at that time it was clear that the Chief Executive was in his final 
years in the lead role and therefore many of the senior management likely considered the 
implications that any strong objections might have had on their future career aspirations 
within the retail firm.  More generally, such situations are associated with periods of success 
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and lead organisations to develop patterns of justification that support the CEO’s pre-existing 
beliefs (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) – conditions which likely lead to a degree of 
‘groupthink’ as management’s desire for unanimity ‘overrides their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of actions’ (Janis, 1982, 9).  Importantly, the careers of many of 
the senior leadership team were inextricably tied to, and embedded within, an 
internationalizing firm where their talents had been accommodated.  Having bought into this 
wider project, there was awareness that success or failure was likely to define personal 
livelihoods alongside firm performance:  
 
‘A U.S. expansion that ultimately “moved the dials” of Tesco’s global presence, or that 
conversely ended in failure, would by default have profound effects on the nature of that 
ongoing organizational morphing. Most visibly, it was likely to play a role in Tesco’s 
leadership succession and, as a consequence, in shaping the vision of the firm’s future 
corporate strategy and its prevailing culture of innovation.’ (Lowe and Wrigley, 2010, 
401). 
 
A change of Chief Executive to Phillip Clarke in 2011, who was largely free of responsibility 
for the strategy, provided adequate cover to announce the intention to divest. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Through the use of a case study of a leading retail TNC, this paper has addressed the role of 
relationships with the providers of finance and the financial community more broadly in 
underpinning the nature, extent and scale of retail globalisation, specifically exploring first 
how the retailer developed a broadly successful “model” of international expansion 
predicated upon a disciplined allocation of capital that appeased investor and analyst 
concerns; and second, how this framework deteriorated and with it the support of leading 
analysts.  In doing so, the article exposes how the retailer was divested of reputational capital 
and needed to reposition itself vis-à-vis the investment community to reinvent its strategy for 
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capital allocation and therefore international expansion.  Tesco is thus identified as a ‘critical 
case’ given its profile, international scale, market reach and its subsequent impacts both 
domestically and internationally.  The paper reveals how pressure from the capital markets 
acts as a key relational moderator of international business expansion.   
While the study is distinctive in its retail-specific focus, the research has implications 
beyond the specific internationalization of food retailing to also be relevant to other service 
organisations (e.g. hotels, restaurants) that share similar demands of capital outlay while 
experiencing robust market oversight (cf. Niewiadomski, 2014).  The paper helps to enrich 
understanding of the critical role played by relations between the firm and finance markets in 
international business expansion.  However, we have been conscious to resist proposing 
simplistic ‘one dimensional accounts that reflect simple a priori about the secret of success 
and which flatter management agency by presuming that management can both understand 
and change the world, in a way which reflects intention and capability’ (Froud et al., 2000, 
102).  We have recognised the relational nature of interactions of firms with the capital 
markets and the causal ambiguity that often persists between strategic inputs and outcomes.  
In doing so the research has explored the globally integrated link between investment 
communities, analysts, the leaders of firms and their emerging strategies.  While these 
interactions are often localised, embedded within personal relationships and situated within 
meetings at established financial centres, they effect − and are affected by − operations across 
the distant geographies of the firm at multiple spatial scales.  Clearly then, the work builds on 
prior research within economic geography which has interrogated relational financial 
networks (Hall, 2015) whether this is through venture capital (Wray, 2012), private equity 
(Jones and Search, 2009) or more widely through institutional investment such as pension 
funds (Torrance, 2009).   
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The case study provides evidence of how the sentiments of the capital markets clearly 
affect the scale, speed and extent of international growth, but also that the nature of capital 
market pressure is (to a point) resistible and contingent – or, as Froud et al. (2014, 48) 
recently put it, ‘What “the market wants” is as much a moveable discursive construct as a set 
of fixed financial targets, as stock market expectations meet counter-narratives from 
corporate management and other relevant actors’.  It also provides a cautionary warning that 
even the most tightly run international firms can suffer without a sustained focus on 
disciplined financial management.  In doing so, retaining the faith of equity analysts and the 
wider investment community is critical to credibility.  Losing focus on the balance between 
capital investment and returns inevitably causes wider ripple effects through the capital 
markets that likely necessitate scaling back of expansion plans.   
In the case of Tesco, these pressures have become significantly more acute since the 
start of 2014 when the timeline for this case study concludes.  This period has seen the 
resignation of the retailer’s CEO, Philip Clarke and the subsequent appointment of Dave 
Lewis from Fast-moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) firm, Unilever.  More damaging was the 
unexpected identification of a £263m overstatement of Tesco’s profits in October 2014 
arising from the way it recognised income from vendors, which struck at the heart of the 
retailer’s reputation for economic competence as did an exceptional pre-tax loss of £6.4bn for 
2014/15.  Such extreme stresses on the retailer’s balance sheet led to further retrenchment 
from international markets beyond those explored in this paper, with the retailer’s South 
Korean Homeplus business sold to private investors for £4.2bn in September 2015.  The 
implications of changing market reactions to international expansion and the divestment of 
international subsidiaries should not be under-estimated, particularly for workers, consumers 
and wider local stakeholders within under-developed host markets.  In this sense, there are 
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certain parallels with the implications of globalisation more widely within publicly listed 
international businesses across both service and manufacturing sectors. 
The case study has also emphasised the limits to agency of both senior management 
and analysts.  The paper has uncovered the role of equity analysts as imperfect assessors and 
validators of a firm’s strategic plans for the wider investment community.  Although 
important agents within the wider stakeholder governance of the retail firm, they may 
overlook shortfalls in strategic planning.  The previous track record of international 
expansion and its leadership is likely to frame the narratives constructed for consumption by 
the investment community.  Meanwhile, the process of actively managing legitimacy with 
capital markets places emphasis on the setting and signalling role of the firm with regard to 
its strategy and intended use of capital.  Over the period under review, Tesco made 
considerable efforts to ‘manage’ the senior management–analyst dialectic in order to present 
their strategies in the most positive light possible.  Just as marketing brands are notoriously 
unstable and constructed for a consumption audience (Pike, 2013), so the ‘finance/capital 
management brand’ of the firm has to be constructed and maintained for consumption by the 
wider capital market community (cf. Clark et al., 2004).  If this form of representation is well 
managed it is more likely that the barometer of positive analyst opinion can be maintained 
even during periods of turbulence and risk.  But there are limits.  A decline in performance of 
the ‘cash cow’ home market which, to a large extent, underpins investor confidence, leads to 
an increasingly diligent focus on capital expenditure and returns at home and abroad.  In our 
analysis, it is clear the focus on capital discipline broke down and re-framing all strategic 
announcements to a consistent ‘capital-light’ narrative became necessary.  When re-setting 
the relationship with the investment community, this signalling process not only concerns 
changes in strategy, but equally likely leads to changes in key leadership and personnel.  
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Removal of key actors so associated with the past stresses a clean break and ensures that 
future governance of the firm is coordinated by individuals unsullied by previous failures. 
There remain significant opportunities for further exploring the interactions between 
international business strategy and the providers of finance.  While our case study is firmly 
embedded within a particular mode of market capitalism with finance flowing through 
competitive capital markets, it would be informative to explore the variegated governance 
effects of relationships with finance providers for international firms originating from within 
different varieties of capitalism and across organisations with different ownership structures.  
Such insights would likely expose a different set of pressures and imperatives that would 
require further agile adaptation and sensitivity in the management of financial relationships – 
themes this paper has provided some important perspectives into. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Placing finance in the governance of the firm 
 
 
Source: adapted from Wrigley and Lowe, 2002 
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Table 1: The increased importance of Tesco’s international operations, 2000-2014  
 
Percentage 
contributions 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 20141 2 
Sales          
UK 90 85 80 76 74 69 67 69 
Rest of Europe 7 9 11 13 14 15 15 15 
Asia 3 6 9 11 12 15 17 16 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 - 
Operating Profit         
UK 95 91 83 78 75 73 69 70 
Rest of Europe 5 7 10 12 14 14 15 8 
Asia 0 2 7 10 11 13 20 22 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 - -4 - 
Total sales area         
UK 70 58 51 47 39 35 35 38 
Rest of Europe 20 25 28 30 30 30 29 31 
Asia 10 17 21 23 31 34 34 30 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 - 
¹ US operations excluded as they cease to be considered “continuing operations” 
2 China is excluded due to joint venture with CRE 
Source: Annual Reports 
Note: Tesco’s financial year finishes at the end of February. 
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Table 2: Tesco plc international operations, sales and estimated margin, 2013 
 
Country  
(Year of Entry) 
Sales  
£m 
 
Market 
Share  
% 
Sales 
Growth  
Y-o-Y 
%  
L-f-L Sales Growth³  
Y-o-Y % 
EBIT 
margin¹  
% 
Store 
Numbers 
 
Total Space  
‘000 sq ft 
 
UK 43,579 30.1 3.2 (0.3) 5.2² 3,146 40,495 
        
Europe 9,312  (5.6) (2.3) 3.5² 1,507 34,077 
Hungary 
(1994) 
1,606 14.9 (9.5) (0.7) 1.2 216 7,329 
Poland 
(1995) 
2,176 7.0 (4.9) (3.0) 5.1 446 9,426 
Slovak Rep. 
(1996) 
1,114 22.8 (1.2) 0.6 4.2 136 3,822 
Czech Rep. 
(1996) 
1,356 10.9 (11.8) (7.0) 3.0 376 6,092 
Rep of Ireland 
(1997 – re-entry) 
2,315 20.0 (5.3) (0.3) 5.9 142 3,455 
Turkey 
(2003) 
745 1.3 7.5 (5.4) (3.4) 191 3,953 
        
Asia 11,422  6.0 (1.8) 5.4² 2,131 41,664 
Thailand 
(1998) 
3,742 13.0 15.7 3.1 7.9 1,433 14,320 
South Korea 
(1999) 
5,311 8.6 (0.5) (5.3) 6.9 520 13,230 
Malaysia 
(2001) 
937 4.8 5.2 0.5 4.9 47 3,918 
China 
(2004) 
1,432 0.2 9.2 (1.1) (5.6) 131 10,196 
        
Continuing operations only 
¹ EBIT Margin is the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes to net revenue - earned. It is a measure of a 
company's profitability on sales over a specific time period. 
² Trading Profit Margin is listed to allow a clear comparison between the main Tesco businesses (i.e. UK, 
Europe, Asia) 
³ Like-for-Like sales provide a comparable measure from stores open the previous year to provide an underlying 
measure of performance that strips out the effects of new stores, extensions and closures. 
 
Source: Tesco Analyst Packs; IGD, 2013a; Shore Capital, 2013b 
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Table 3: Tesco plc international acquisitions and joint ventures (continuing operations only) 
 
Continent/ 
Country  Date Company acquired 
Price paid  
(£m) No. stores Notes 
Rest of Europe 
Ireland May-97 ABF's Irish food business 643 109  
Czech 
Republic Apr-96 Kmart CR 79  6 Price includes Kmart SR. 
  Sep-05 Carrefour Czech republic 70 11  
Slovak and Czech business 
exchanged for 6 stores, 2 
sites in Taiwan 
Hungary Jun-94 74% of Global TH 15 44   
  1996 Further 23% of Global TH 3     
Poland Sep-02 HIT 400 15 
13 HM + 2 under- 
construction 
  Nov-06 Leader Price 10 146    
Slovakia Apr-96 Kmart SR 79 7  Price includes Kmart CR 
  Sep-05 Carrefour Slovakia asset swap 4  
Slovak and Czech business 
exchanged for 6 stores, 2 
sites in Taiwan 
Turkey Nov-03 Kipa 96 5   
    SUB-TOTAL 1,316     
Asia           
China Jul-04 50% of Hymall 148 25  
  Dec-06 Further 40% 181 -  
Malaysia Nov-01 70:30 JV with Sime Darby 0 -  
  Dec-06 Makro from SHV 73 8  
South Korea May-99 51% of Samsung Tesco 85     
  Jun-99 + 30% of Samsung Tesco 57  -   
  Feb-02 + 8% of Samsung Tesco n.d  -   
  Jul-07 + 5% of Samsung Tesco 40-60  -   
  Jul-11 + 5% of Samsung Tesco n.d  -   
  Mar-05 
Store acquisition from 
Aram Mart 49 12 3 HMs, 9 SMs 
  Apr-08 
Homever stores from E-
Land 958 36 HMs 
50% on acquisition and 
50% after sales uplifts 
achieved 
Thailand May-98 Lotus 206 13 HM  
    SUB-TOTAL 1,807     
  
TOTAL CURRENT MARKETS 5,059     
 
HM - Hypermarket 
SM - Supermarket 
CS – Convenience Store 
Source: Barclays Capital and JP Morgan (personal communication) with modifications 
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Table 4: Tesco revised strategies and priorities in international development, 2013 
 
Priority Countries Strategy 
Priority 1: Significant future 
potential 
Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia Highest international priority. 
Continue to build on, and invest in, 
leading positions in fast growing 
economies. 
Priority 2: Improve returns, hold 
position 
Ireland, Czech Rep, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia 
Hold position.  Make targeted 
investment in specific 
opportunities, such as online and 
convenience retailing. 
Priority 3: Refocus on more 
profitable approach to growth 
China, India, Turkey Long term growth opportunities. 
Adopt a more cautious approach to 
growth and capital allocation. 
Source: developed from company data and analyst reports 
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